Educational Technology and Change Journal

By Jim Shimabukuro (assisted by Gemini)
Editor

Introduction: I had another wide-ranging discussion with Gemini this morning, which began with a question on NATO’s reluctance to provide the degree of assistance Ukraine needs to oust Russia from the territories they’re occupying and branched into a number of probabilities: An independent Crimea? Ukraine emerging from this war as a powerful military presence in Europe? Peace leaving Ukraine between a rock and a hard place? And Ukraine becoming the Israel of Eastern Europe? -js

JS: Good morning, Gemini. NATO’s paralyzing reluctance to provide the kind of aid that Ukraine needs to oust Russia from its occupied territories seems to be based in its fear of Putin’s threat to escalate with nuclear weapons or attack the countries providing aid and, thus, force all NATO members to enter the conflict. Is this an accurate claim? If not, please enlighten me. If it’s accurate, share your researched opinion on the likelihood that Putin will follow through with his threat if NATO countries provide all the firepower Ukraine needs to turn the tide of the war and win back its territories. On another note, would Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continue if Putin were removed from his position? Or would the invasion collapse and all lands taken from Ukraine, including Crimea, be returned?

Gemini: Good morning to you too! Let’s break down your claims and questions regarding the situation in Ukraine.

NATO’s Reluctance and Fear of Escalation

Your claim that “NATO’s paralyzing reluctance to provide the kind of aid that Ukraine needs to oust Russia from its occupied territories seems to be based in its fear of Putin’s threat to escalate with nuclear weapons or attack the countries providing aid and, thus, force all NATO members to enter the conflict” is largely accurate.

Here’s why:

• Nuclear Deterrence: From the outset of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, Russia, and particularly Vladimir Putin, has repeatedly engaged in nuclear saber-rattling.¹ This has been a consistent tactic to deter direct NATO intervention and to limit the scope and type of military assistance provided to Ukraine.² NATO and its members have been very cautious about actions that could be perceived by Russia as a direct threat to its existence or its strategic nuclear forces, which could theoretically trigger a nuclear response based on Russia’s military doctrine.
• Article 5 Invocation: A direct attack by Russia on a NATO member country would invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which states that an armed attack against one member is considered an attack against all.³ This would legally obligate all NATO members to come to the aid of the attacked member, potentially leading to a direct military conflict between NATO and Russia. NATO’s stated position is to avoid direct confrontation with Russia to prevent a wider, more devastating war in Europe. Therefore, the Alliance has been careful to provide aid to Ukraine without becoming a direct party to the conflict.
• Escalation Control: The strategic dilemma for NATO has been to support Ukraine’s self-defense effectively while managing the risk of escalation. This involves a delicate balancing act, often leading to incremental increases in aid rather than a sudden provision of all possible “firepower.” The goal is to avoid crossing perceived “red lines” that Russia might react to with more severe measures, including conventional attacks on aid routes or, in the most extreme scenario, the use of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons.

Likelihood of Putin Following Through with Threats

It’s crucial to understand that assessing the likelihood of Putin following through with nuclear threats or direct attacks on NATO countries is highly speculative and subject to many variables. However, based on expert analysis and observed behavior:

• Nuclear Weapons:
  • Low but Non-Zero Probability: Most analysts believe the likelihood of Putin using nuclear weapons, even if NATO fully equips Ukraine to win, remains low. The catastrophic consequences of nuclear war for Russia itself, including international pariah status, devastating retaliation from NATO, and the immediate and long-term effects of radiation, make it an incredibly high-risk option with no clear military benefit in Ukraine.
  • “Escalate to De-escalate” Misconception: While some Western analysts have discussed a Russian “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine (using a tactical nuclear weapon to shock an adversary into concessions), many argue this is a mischaracterization or that its application in Ukraine is unlikely given the military disadvantages and global backlash.
  • Strategic vs. Tactical: If there were to be any nuclear use, it would most likely be a tactical nuclear weapon on Ukrainian territory as a “demonstration” rather than a strategic strike on a NATO country. Even then, the military gains would be minimal, and the political and humanitarian costs would be immense. Putin himself has stated that the “need to use those (nuclear) weapons… and I hope they will not be required.”⁴
• Attack on NATO Countries:
  • Unlikely Direct Conventional Attack: A direct conventional military attack by Russia on a NATO country providing aid is also considered unlikely. Such an attack would immediately trigger Article 5, drawing all 32 NATO members into the conflict. Russia’s conventional military, despite its size, has shown significant limitations in Ukraine and would be severely outmatched by the combined forces of NATO.
  • Hybrid Warfare/Cyber Attacks: More likely, if Russia sought to retaliate against aid-providing countries, it would continue to employ hybrid warfare tactics: cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, political destabilization efforts, and potentially sabotage within NATO countries. These actions are designed to be below the threshold of an Article 5 invocation while still creating disruption and pressure.

My researched opinion: While the fear of escalation is a legitimate factor in NATO’s decision-making, it’s not a “paralyzing reluctance” in the sense that no aid is given. Instead, it’s a calculated risk management strategy. Putin’s threats are primarily a deterrent, and the catastrophic consequences for Russia of nuclear use or a direct attack on NATO make a follow-through highly improbable, though not impossible. The risk, however small, is deemed too high to ignore by NATO leaders, hence the measured approach to aid.

Impact of Putin’s Removal on the Invasion

This is another highly complex question with no definitive answer, as it depends heavily on the circumstances of his removal and who or what replaces him.

• Uncertainty of Successor: If Putin were removed, the most critical factor would be the nature of the succession.
  • Hardline Successor: A hardline successor might be even more committed to the war, or even escalate it, to consolidate power and demonstrate strength.
  • More Pragmatic Successor: A more pragmatic leader might seek a path to de-escalation and negotiation, but would still face significant internal pressures and potentially entrenched interests within the military and security apparatus.
• Internal Russian Dynamics: The invasion is not solely Putin’s war; it has some degree of support within various segments of Russian society, even if that support is manipulated by state media.⁵ The Russian military and security services have invested heavily in the conflict. A new leader would have to contend with these internal dynamics.
• Motivations for the War: Beyond Putin, there are broader geopolitical motivations within certain Russian circles regarding Ukraine’s pro-Western alignment, NATO expansion, and perceived historical grievances. These underlying issues might persist even with a new leader.

Therefore, it’s unlikely that the invasion would simply “collapse” immediately upon Putin’s removal. There would likely be a period of significant uncertainty and potential internal power struggles. A new leadership might:

• Seek a negotiated settlement: This is a possibility, especially if the new leadership recognizes the unsustainable economic and human cost of the war. However, the terms of such a settlement would be highly contentious.
• Continue the war, perhaps with different tactics: The new leader might maintain the war effort, albeit with a different strategy or narrative, to avoid appearing weak or to achieve specific objectives.

Return of Occupied Territories, Including Crimea

The return of all lands, including Crimea, would be an even more challenging outcome:

• Crimea: Crimea is a particularly sensitive issue for Russia, deeply ingrained in its national narrative.⁶ It was annexed in 2014, and Russia has heavily militarized it and integrated it into its administrative structure.⁷ Even if a new Russian leader were more amenable to negotiations, surrendering Crimea would likely be seen as a significant concession and could face immense internal opposition. It’s considered by many to be a “red line” for Russia.
• Other Occupied Territories: The territories illegally annexed in September 2022 (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia) are also heavily contested. While their status might be more negotiable than Crimea, Russia has formally claimed them as part of its territory. A new Russian leader would face immense pressure not to “give up” what Russia has formally declared its own.

In conclusion, while Putin’s removal would undoubtedly introduce a new dynamic, predicting a full collapse of the invasion and the immediate return of all territories, especially Crimea, is highly optimistic. The future of the conflict would depend on the nature of the new leadership, the internal political landscape in Russia, and the ongoing military situation on the ground.

JS: IF Ukraine and Russia agreed to recognize Crimea as an independent country with the internal power to determine its own future, and if the Ukrainian lands recently conquered by Russia are returned, would both sides be willing to end the war? If this occurs, what are the probabilities that independent Crimea would choose to be part of Russia or Ukraine or remain independent and neutral?

Gemini: Your proposed scenario for peace is highly insightful, as it touches upon the core territorial disputes at the heart of the conflict. Let’s analyze the willingness of both sides to end the war under these conditions and the probabilities for an independent Crimea.

Would Both Sides Be Willing to End the War?

This scenario presents a significant potential pathway to peace, as it addresses key demands from both sides, but it’s far from guaranteed.

• Ukraine’s Perspective:
  • Pro: The return of all recently conquered Ukrainian lands would be a major victory for Ukraine, fulfilling a crucial war aim and restoring territorial integrity (excluding Crimea). This would be a strong incentive for peace, especially given the immense human and economic cost of the war. Security guarantees for Ukraine would also be paramount.
  • Con: Ukraine’s official stance, enshrined in its constitution and publicly reiterated by President Zelenskyy, is that Crimea is an integral part of Ukraine and must be returned. Agreeing to Crimea’s independence, even with self-determination, would be a major concession and a deviation from this stated policy. Many Ukrainians view Crimea as historically and culturally linked to Ukraine, and its loss, even as an independent entity, would be difficult to accept. The concept of “victory” for Ukraine has increasingly come to mean the full restoration of its 1991 borders, including Crimea.
• Russia’s Perspective:
  • Pro: Russia’s primary stated objective, beyond “denazification” and “demilitarization” (which are ambiguous), has increasingly centered on territorial gains and establishing a buffer zone. The permanent removal of Crimea from Ukraine’s direct control, even as an independent state, could be spun as a victory for Russia, as it would secure its Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol and remove a potential NATO foothold. Returning the recently conquered lands might be a bitter pill, but if it meant an end to sanctions and a normalization of relations, some factions within Russia might consider it.
  • Con: Russia has formally annexed the four Ukrainian regions (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson) and declared them part of the Russian Federation. Public opinion in Russia, influenced by state propaganda, largely supports retaining these territories and Crimea. Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated that these “new territorial realities” are non-negotiable. Forcing Russia to return these lands would be a significant public and political defeat for Putin and his regime. It would also undermine the narrative that Russia is “protecting” Russian speakers in these areas.

Conclusion on Willingness to End the War:

While your scenario offers a compelling compromise, the likelihood of both sides agreeing to it fully is still low to moderate in the current political climate. Both sides have maximalist positions, and significant internal political capital has been invested in these maximalist demands. Ukraine’s insistence on Crimea’s return and Russia’s declared annexation of the other regions remain major hurdles. A willingness to compromise would likely only emerge if both sides felt a prolonged war was unsustainable and a military victory was unattainable, leading to a “mutually hurting stalemate.”

Probabilities of Independent Crimea’s Choice

If Crimea were to genuinely become an independent country with the internal power to determine its own future (a truly free and fair referendum/process, unlike the 2014 annexation vote), the probabilities would be complex due to its unique demographics and history:

• To Be Part of Russia (Highest Probability: 60-70%)
  • Demographics: As of the 2001 Ukrainian census (pre-annexation), ethnic Russians constituted about 60% of Crimea’s population, with Ukrainians at 24% and Crimean Tatars at 10.8%. Since 2014, Russia has reportedly engaged in a deliberate policy of relocating hundreds of thousands of Russians to Crimea and compelling Ukrainians to leave, further shifting the demographic balance.
  • Cultural and Linguistic Ties: A significant majority of Crimea’s population, including many ethnic Ukrainians, identify Russian as their native language and have strong cultural ties to Russia.
  • Media Environment: For the past decade, the information space in Crimea has been dominated by Russian state media, which has consistently promoted pro-Russian narratives and suppressed pro-Ukrainian or neutral voices. This would have a lasting impact on public opinion.
  • Economic Integration: Since 2014, Crimea has been deeply integrated into Russia’s economic and administrative systems. While this has had its downsides due to sanctions, reversing this integration and building new ties with Ukraine or other nations would be a massive undertaking.
  • Strategic Importance to Russia: Russia views Crimea as a sacred and strategically vital territory due to the Sevastopol naval base. Russia would exert immense pressure, both overt and covert, to ensure Crimea’s alignment with Moscow.
• To Be Part of Ukraine (Low Probability: 10-15%)
  • Crimean Tatars: The indigenous Crimean Tatar population, which suffered mass deportations under Stalin, has largely been opposed to Russian annexation and maintains strong ties to Ukraine. Their political and cultural rights were severely curtailed under Russian occupation. They would likely vote overwhelmingly to return to Ukraine.
  • Pro-Ukrainian Ukrainians: There are still many ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea who identify with Ukraine and would prefer to be part of it. However, many have left since 2014, and those remaining face significant pressure.
  • International Recognition: Ukraine and the vast majority of the international community still recognize Crimea as Ukrainian territory under international law.
• Remain Independent and Neutral (Moderate Probability: 20-30%)
  • Compromise Position: For some, particularly those who are neither strongly pro-Russian nor strongly pro-Ukrainian, independence might be seen as a way to avoid being caught between two larger powers. It could offer a path to self-governance and potentially some level of international aid and recognition.
  • “Crimean” Identity: Some residents, especially younger generations or those who have lived their entire lives in Crimea under various administrative shifts, might develop a distinct “Crimean” identity separate from both Russian and Ukrainian nationalisms.
  • Economic Viability: The economic viability of a small, independent Crimea without strong ties to either large neighbor would be a significant challenge. However, international guarantees and investment could potentially make it feasible.
  • Pressure from Neighbors: Both Russia and Ukraine would likely continue to exert significant influence and pressure on an independent Crimea, making true neutrality difficult to maintain in the long term.

Overall: Given the demographic realities, the deep integration into Russia since 2014, and Russia’s strategic interest and likely continued influence, the highest probability is that an “independent” Crimea, if truly allowed to self-determine, would eventually choose to align with or become part of Russia. However, this is contingent on the political process being genuinely free and fair, which is a big “if” considering Russia’s track record. The desire for neutrality and self-governance might be a significant factor for a notable minority.

JS: The fact that Russia is struggling mightily against a country as weak as Ukraine seems to be lost among NATO members. The lesson seems obvious: Russia is a lot weaker than previously thought. What is your opinion on this perspective? Shouldn’t NATO see that the sheep is in wolf’s clothing, flex its muscles, and demand that Russia desist and return all lands stolen from Ukraine?

Gemini: You’ve hit upon a critical point that is indeed a subject of significant debate and analysis within security circles. Let’s explore this perspective:

Is Russia Weaker Than Previously Thought?

Your assessment is largely correct. The conflict in Ukraine has exposed significant weaknesses in the Russian military that surprised many observers, including:

• Logistical Failures: Initial advances were hampered by poor logistics, including inadequate fuel, food, and maintenance for vehicles.
• Command and Control Issues: A rigid, centralized command structure has often led to inflexibility on the battlefield and high casualty rates for junior officers.
• Corruption: Widespread corruption within the Russian military and defense industry likely led to inflated equipment numbers, poorly maintained materiel, and a lack of modern, high-quality gear.
• Personnel Quality: While Russia has a large number of troops, the quality of training, particularly for mobilized and conscripted soldiers, has been questionable. The loss of experienced professional soldiers and junior officers has been particularly detrimental.
• Air Force Underperformance: Russia’s air force, despite its numerical superiority, has failed to establish air superiority over Ukraine, primarily due to effective Ukrainian air defenses and apparent deficiencies in Russian air doctrine and training for complex air operations.
• Reliance on Older Equipment: While Russia is increasing production of some weapons, it has largely relied on reactivating and modernizing Soviet-era equipment from storage, indicating a struggle to produce genuinely new and technologically advanced systems at scale due to sanctions and pre-existing industrial weaknesses.
• High Casualties: Russia has suffered staggering casualties in personnel and equipment, far exceeding initial expectations. Estimates suggest hundreds of thousands of killed and wounded.

However, it’s crucial to avoid oversimplification. While Russia’s performance against Ukraine has revealed weaknesses, it’s not a “sheep in wolf’s clothing” in an absolute sense.

• Still a Formidable Foe: Russia still possesses a large military, significant artillery and missile production capabilities (outpacing NATO in some areas like shells in the short term), a robust electronic warfare capability, and a large nuclear arsenal. Their strategy has shifted to one of attrition, leveraging quantitative advantages in personnel and firepower to slowly wear down Ukrainian defenses.
• Adaptation: The Russian military has shown some ability to adapt, improving its drone warfare tactics and defensive fortifications.
• NATO vs. Ukraine Context: It’s important to remember that Ukraine, while receiving substantial Western aid, started the war with a significantly smaller and less equipped military than Russia. Russia’s struggles are relative to the expectations of its performance against a much weaker adversary, not necessarily an indication that it couldn’t pose a serious threat to a full-fledged NATO response.

Should NATO Flex Its Muscles and Demand Russia Desist?

NATO’s current strategy is a carefully calibrated balance, driven by several factors:

• Avoid Direct Conflict: NATO’s primary goal is to avoid a direct military confrontation with Russia that could escalate into a wider European or even global conflict, potentially involving nuclear weapons. This is the overarching “red line.”
• Support for Ukraine: NATO members are providing unprecedented levels of military, financial, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine to enable it to defend itself. This is seen as the most effective way to weaken Russia and support Ukraine without triggering Article 5. NATO has formally condemned Russia’s aggression and demanded Russia withdraw all forces from Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders, including Crimea.
• Strengthening Deterrence: The war in Ukraine has significantly revitalized NATO. Member states are increasing defense spending, strengthening their collective defense capabilities, and deploying more forces to the eastern flank. This is to deter any Russian aggression against NATO territory itself. New members like Finland and Sweden further strengthen this posture.
• Economic Pressure: Sanctions on Russia are intended to weaken its economy and military-industrial complex in the long term, making it harder for Russia to sustain its war effort and rebuild its military.

Opinion on “Flexing Muscles and Demanding”:

While the idea of NATO more forcefully “flexing its muscles” might seem appealing given Russia’s struggles, the current approach is based on a calculated risk assessment.

• The Nuclear Shadow: Even a weakened Russia still possesses the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. The threat of nuclear escalation, however low the probability, cannot be entirely discounted by NATO leaders who are responsible for the security of hundreds of millions of people. Any direct military intervention by NATO would significantly raise this risk.
• Escalation Ladder: There’s a concern about how Russia might interpret more aggressive NATO actions (e.g., direct air patrols over Ukraine, deployment of NATO troops to Ukraine). Such actions could be perceived by Moscow as an existential threat, leading to unpredictable and dangerous escalations beyond conventional warfare.
• Internal NATO Unity: While NATO has shown remarkable unity in supporting Ukraine, there are varying levels of risk tolerance among member states. A unilateral “demanding” posture backed by immediate military action could strain this unity.
• NATO’s Demands Already Exist: NATO’s official stance already includes condemning Russia’s aggression in the strongest terms, demanding immediate withdrawal from all Ukrainian territory (including Crimea), and refusing to recognize any illegal annexations. This isn’t a new demand; it’s a consistent position. The question is how to enforce it without triggering a wider war.

In conclusion, while it’s true that Russia’s military performance has been far below expectations, NATO’s strategy is not simply ignoring this. Instead, it informs a strategy of deterrence, defense, and calibrated support to Ukraine. The “sheep in wolf’s clothing” metaphor might capture some aspects of Russia’s conventional military weaknesses, but it overlooks the critical factor of Russia’s nuclear capabilities and its willingness to absorb immense losses, as well as the inherent risks of direct confrontation for NATO. The current approach seeks to bleed Russia’s conventional capabilities in Ukraine while avoiding a direct and potentially catastrophic conflict with a nuclear-armed power.

JS: What are your thoughts on the probability that Ukraine will emerge from this conflict as a powerful military presence in Europe even if it agrees to peace terms that allow Russia to keep all Ukrainian lands it now occupies by force? Is it possible that the war has strengthened Ukraine to the point where it can now militarily, economically, and politically develop into a significant world power? And if this is the case, then could Ukraine, at some time in the future, force Russia, through political and economic pressure and the threat of a strong and proven military, to return the stolen lands?

Gemini: This is a fascinating and critical question, as it delves into the long-term implications of the conflict and Ukraine’s potential trajectory.

Probability of Ukraine Emerging as a Powerful Military Presence in Europe

Even if Ukraine agrees to peace terms that allow Russia to keep occupied lands, the probability of Ukraine emerging as a powerful military presence in Europe is high. Here’s why:

• Battle-Hardened and Experienced: The Ukrainian armed forces are arguably the most battle-hardened and experienced military in Europe, having fought a full-scale, high-intensity war against a major conventional power for years. This direct combat experience, especially against Russian tactics, is invaluable.
• NATO Standard Interoperability: Extensive Western military aid has not just provided equipment, but has also trained Ukrainian forces in NATO tactics, doctrine, and interoperability. This means Ukraine’s military will be far more compatible with Western forces than before the war.
• Modernized Equipment: While starting with a largely Soviet-era arsenal, Ukraine has received and integrated vast amounts of modern Western weaponry, from artillery and armored vehicles to air defense systems and drones. This process will continue, leading to a significantly more modern military.
• Domestic Defense Industry Revival: The war has spurred a remarkable growth in Ukraine’s domestic defense industry, particularly in drone production and other innovative technologies. This self-sufficiency, even if partial, is crucial for long-term military power. Ukraine is now producing a significant portion of its own weapons, ammunition, and drones, with ambitious plans for further expansion and innovation.
• Strong International Support for Defense: Even if peace terms are reached, Western nations are likely to continue providing long-term security assistance and defense cooperation to Ukraine to deter future Russian aggression. This ongoing support will be a cornerstone of Ukraine’s military strength.
• Large Mobilized Force: Ukraine has a large number of citizens with military experience, having mobilized extensively during the war. Even if the active force downsizes post-conflict, a well-trained reserve will remain.

Possibility of Ukraine Developing into a Significant World Power

This is a more ambitious claim, and while “world power” might be a stretch in the near term, Ukraine’s potential for significant development is considerable.

• Militarily: As discussed, a powerful regional military presence in Europe is highly probable. Whether this translates to “world power” status depends on its ability to project power globally, which is a different scale. However, its innovations in drone warfare and adaptation of modern combat tactics could influence military thinking worldwide.
• Economically: This is the biggest challenge, especially if significant territory remains occupied.
  • Devastating Destruction: The war has caused immense physical destruction to infrastructure, industry, and housing. The cost of reconstruction is estimated to be hundreds of billions of dollars.
  • Loss of Human Capital: Millions of Ukrainians have fled the country, and thousands have been killed or maimed. Reversing this “brain drain” and addressing labor shortages will be critical.
  • Loss of Resources: Russia occupies significant industrial and agricultural areas, as well as access to the Azov Sea.
  • Massive International Aid: Ukraine will require colossal international financial aid for reconstruction, which is already being pledged. Success will depend on the effective and transparent utilization of these funds.
  • EU Integration: Ukraine’s path towards EU membership, including ongoing negotiations, is a powerful driver for economic and political reforms, attracting investment, and integrating into the large European single market. This could be a transformative factor.
  • Corruption Fight: Pre-war Ukraine struggled with corruption. The war has, in some ways, galvanized efforts against it, but continued progress on governance and rule of law will be crucial for attracting sustainable foreign investment.
• Politically:
  • Strengthened National Identity: The war has forged an incredibly strong and unified Ukrainian national identity, distinct from Russia.
  • Democratic Resilience: Despite the war, Ukraine has shown remarkable democratic resilience, with a functioning administration and a commitment to European democratic values.
  • EU and NATO Aspirations: The clear stated goal of joining the EU and eventually NATO (even if the latter is delayed) provides a strong reform agenda and anchor for its political development.
  • Geopolitical Significance: Ukraine’s role as a bulwark against Russian aggression has cemented its geopolitical importance. It will likely remain a key player in European security architecture.

Therefore, while “world power” might be a stretch, Ukraine absolutely has the potential to develop into a significant regional power in Europe, with strong military, economic, and political ties to the West.

Could Ukraine Force Russia to Return Stolen Lands in the Future?

This is the most speculative part of your question, but it’s not impossible, especially under certain conditions:

• Long-Term Military Strength: If Ukraine consistently maintains and even enhances its military strength, potentially surpassing Russia in specific technological or tactical areas, this creates a credible deterrent and a potential offensive capability.
• Economic Disparity: If Ukraine, through successful reconstruction and EU integration, becomes significantly more prosperous and economically powerful than Russia (especially if Russia remains under heavy sanctions and isolated), this creates a powerful leverage point.
• Political and Diplomatic Pressure: A strong, democratic, and integrated Ukraine within Western institutions would have immense political and diplomatic leverage. It could relentlessly lobby for the continuation of sanctions, isolation, and international pressure on Russia regarding the occupied territories.
• Internal Russian Weakness: The ability to force Russia to return lands would heavily depend on future internal developments within Russia. A weakened, unstable, or more democratic Russia might be more amenable to ceding territory in exchange for normalizing relations, sanctions relief, or to address internal unrest.
• Shifting Geopolitical Landscape: Future shifts in global power dynamics or a significant weakening of Russia’s alliances (e.g., with China) could also create an environment where Russia’s hold on occupied territories becomes untenable.
• “Frozen Conflict” Mentality: While Ukraine might agree to peace terms out of necessity, it would almost certainly view any loss of territory as temporary. This “frozen conflict” status would mean Ukraine would constantly seek opportunities to reclaim its land through non-military and, if circumstances permit, military means.

Probability: Forcing Russia to return all stolen lands, including Crimea, through political and economic pressure and military threat (without a renewed full-scale war), is low to moderate in the short to medium term. Crimea, in particular, remains a deeply entrenched issue for Russia. However, in the long term (decades), and contingent on Ukraine’s sustained development and Russia’s potential internal changes, it becomes a more plausible, though still challenging, outcome. Ukraine would likely pursue a multi-pronged strategy combining military deterrence, economic leverage, diplomatic isolation, and capitalizing on any future Russian vulnerabilities.

JS: In the context of this war-ending scenario, you seem reluctant to broach the topic of Ukraine’s chances of joining NATO soon after the end of conflict. Why? Will NATO still be reluctant to accept Ukraine as a full member? Are the fear of Russian pushback, political corruption, historical conflicts with some members, or other issues still obstacles to full acceptance? Finally, will NATO membership help or hamper Ukraine’s efforts to regain lost territories?

Gemini: You’re absolutely right to pick up on that! My reluctance to directly address Ukraine’s NATO membership in the war-ending scenario where Russia retains occupied lands stems from the very complexities and obstacles you’ve identified. It’s a highly contentious issue with significant implications.

Let’s break down the reasons why NATO will still be reluctant and how membership might affect Ukraine’s territorial claims:

Why NATO Will Still Be Reluctant to Accept Ukraine as a Full Member (Even Post-Conflict with Occupied Lands)

The core issue remains: Article 5 of the NATO treaty. This collective defense clause states that an attack on one member is an attack on all.¹ If Ukraine were to join NATO with Russian-occupied territories (including Crimea and the annexed regions), NATO would, in theory, immediately be at war with Russia under Article 5. This is the primary and overwhelming obstacle.

Here’s a more detailed breakdown of the factors at play:

1. Fear of Direct Russian Pushback/Article 5 Invocation (The Dominant Factor):
   • Direct Conflict with a Nuclear Power: This is the paramount concern. NATO’s fundamental purpose is collective defense, but it is also to deter a major war. Admitting Ukraine with active territorial disputes with Russia would mean inheriting a direct, ongoing conflict with a nuclear-armed adversary. No NATO member wants to risk a direct military confrontation with Russia, which could easily escalate beyond conventional warfare.
   • Putin’s “Red Line”: Regardless of Russia’s conventional military performance, the Kremlin views Ukraine’s potential NATO membership as an existential threat and a “red line.”² While this doesn’t justify Russia’s aggression, it’s a political reality that NATO leaders must consider.
2. Territorial Disputes (The “Imported Conflict” Problem):
   • NATO has a long-standing unwritten rule (or at least a strong preference) not to admit countries with active, unresolved territorial disputes. The concern is that the alliance would immediately “import” a conflict and be obligated to defend the new member’s disputed territory. This is explicitly the case with Ukraine, which has significant portions of its internationally recognized territory under Russian occupation.³
   • If a peace deal allowed Russia to keep territories, that would effectively be acknowledging a “frozen conflict” on Ukraine’s borders (and within its internationally recognized borders). NATO would be wary of bringing such a situation directly into the alliance.
3. Political Will and Consensus:
   • NATO decisions require consensus among all members.⁴ While many Eastern European and Baltic states are strong advocates for Ukraine’s immediate membership, some Western European powers (like Germany and France, traditionally) have been more cautious due to the aforementioned risks. Achieving unanimity for Ukraine’s accession under conditions of partial occupation would be extremely difficult.
   • The “open door policy” of NATO is often cited, but it’s a qualified one. Countries must meet certain criteria and be able to contribute to collective security.
4. Corruption and Governance (Less Prominent but Still Relevant):
   • Before the war, concerns about corruption and governance reforms in Ukraine were often cited as obstacles.⁵ While Ukraine has made significant strides in reforms, particularly during wartime, and has demonstrated remarkable resilience, the full implementation of democratic and anti-corruption reforms to NATO standards is an ongoing process.⁶ This is less of a direct impediment than Article 5, but it’s part of the comprehensive criteria for membership.
5. Historical Conflicts with Some Members (Minor Factor):
   • While there have been historical sensitivities (e.g., with Poland over certain historical events), these are generally minor compared to the geopolitical and security concerns. The overwhelming solidarity shown by NATO members with Ukraine has largely overshadowed these past issues.

Will NATO Membership Help or Hamper Ukraine’s Efforts to Regain Lost Territories?

This is a double-edged sword:

• Potential Help (Indirectly and Long-Term):
  • Long-Term Deterrence: If Ukraine could join NATO with its pre-2014 or pre-2022 borders fully restored, NATO membership would provide an iron-clad security guarantee (Article 5) against future Russian aggression. This would be the ultimate deterrent.
  • Enhanced Military Integration: Even without Article 5 applying to currently occupied lands, full NATO membership would further deepen military interoperability, intelligence sharing, and access to advanced weaponry and training, making Ukraine an even more formidable military force capable of deterring future attacks or, in theory, eventually reclaiming territory if the geopolitical situation dramatically shifts.
  • Economic Stability: NATO membership, often linked with EU accession, would further stabilize Ukraine economically, attracting investment and strengthening its capacity to rebuild and potentially outpace Russia economically.
• Potential Hamper (In the Immediate War-Ending Scenario):
  • Unrealistic Expectation: If Ukraine accepts a peace deal where Russia retains territory, demanding NATO membership immediately after would likely be a non-starter for NATO. It would destabilize the peace agreement and reignite direct conflict fears.
  • Focus on Deterrence, Not Reclamation: NATO is a defensive alliance. Its primary role would be to defend Ukraine’s new borders (post-peace deal). While NATO members universally recognize Ukraine’s territorial integrity, NATO itself is highly unlikely to directly launch an offensive operation to reclaim lost territory for a new member, particularly against a nuclear power. That would be seen as an act of war, not defense.
  • Loss of Leverage in Peace Talks: If Ukraine’s aspiration to join NATO is a strong bargaining chip, putting it off the table in a peace deal that cedes land might be seen as a negative. However, if peace requires not joining NATO immediately, then it’s a trade-off.

Overall: In the war-ending scenario you’ve presented (where Russia keeps some land), Ukraine’s immediate NATO membership would likely hamper efforts to regain lost territories through direct military action by NATO, because NATO would be extremely reluctant to admit a member with an ongoing, hot territorial dispute with a major nuclear power.

NATO’s approach would likely be to continue strong bilateral security guarantees and military assistance to Ukraine, help rebuild its economy, and support its EU integration path. This would aim to make Ukraine so strong and integrated with the West that, over the long term, Russia’s hold on occupied territories becomes economically and politically unsustainable, and Ukraine’s military strength provides a powerful deterrent and a basis for future negotiations or, in an extreme future scenario, reclamation. But it wouldn’t be NATO doing the reclaiming on Day 1 of membership.

JS: Would it be fair to say that Ukraine is between a rock and a hard place when it comes to a peace agreement that cedes territory to Russia and its aspirations to join NATO? Peace with contested borders might mean NATO rejection? Continued warfare and even victory against Russia in reclaiming territory, however unlikely, excludes the possibilty of membership? Ukraine seems damned one way or the other. Are there other scenarios with the possibility of better outcomes?

Gemini: You’ve perfectly articulated Ukraine’s “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” dilemma. It truly is between a rock and a hard place when considering the immediate implications of a peace deal that cedes territory and its NATO aspirations.

The “Damned One Way or the Other” Dilemma Explained:

1. Peace with Contested Borders (Ceding Territory) → NATO Rejection (Likely in the Short-Term):
   • As we’ve discussed, NATO’s primary rule is not to “import” a conflict. If Ukraine were to make a peace deal that formalizes Russia’s control over some Ukrainian territory, that would create a “frozen conflict” situation. Admitting Ukraine then would mean NATO members would be obliged by Article 5 to defend these newly defined, but still contested, borders, and implicitly the right to reclaim the lost territory. This is a direct path to war with Russia, which NATO is desperate to avoid.
   • Therefore, any peace agreement that leaves Russian forces on Ukrainian soil would almost certainly mean a delay, potentially a very long delay, in full NATO membership.
2. Continued Warfare and Victory (Reclaiming Territory) → Excludes Possibility of Membership (Potentially):
   • This is the more complex scenario. If Ukraine were to somehow achieve a military victory that pushed Russia entirely out of its internationally recognized borders (including Crimea), this would theoretically remove the “contested borders” obstacle.
   • However, the path to such a victory would likely be so devastating and destabilizing for Russia (and potentially for the broader region) that it could trigger extreme Russian responses, potentially even involving non-conventional weapons.
   • Furthermore, a Russia that has just suffered such a decisive defeat might be even more unpredictable and hostile, making NATO members wary of immediately admitting Ukraine, even with clear borders, as it could still be seen as provoking a revanchist Russia.
   • The “unlikelihood” of this complete military victory also makes it a less practical scenario for planning NATO accession in the near future.

So, yes, the current situation does present Ukraine with a deeply painful set of choices, where its most desired security guarantee (NATO membership) seems to conflict with the practical realities of achieving peace and avoiding wider escalation.

Other Scenarios with the Possibility of Better Outcomes:

While no scenario is without significant challenges, there are other pathways and long-term strategies being explored that aim for a better outcome for Ukraine’s security and sovereignty:

1. “Israel Model” / Bilateral Security Guarantees:
   • Scenario: Instead of immediate NATO membership, Ukraine receives long-term, legally binding bilateral security guarantees from key NATO members (e.g., the US, UK, Germany, France). These agreements would include commitments for sustained military aid, intelligence sharing, training, and rapid consultations in case of future aggression. They would not include an Article 5-like mutual defense clause, thereby avoiding direct NATO involvement in a conflict over disputed territories.
   • Pros: Provides a robust level of security and military interoperability without triggering Article 5. It acknowledges Ukraine’s urgent security needs while sidestepping the “contested borders” dilemma. Many such agreements have already been signed (e.g., with the UK, Germany, France, etc.).
   • Cons: These guarantees are not as strong as Article 5. Their effectiveness relies on the political will of individual guarantor states, which could change over time. It doesn’t offer the full political and diplomatic integration of NATO membership.
   • Outcome for Territorial Claims: This scenario allows Ukraine to maintain its long-term claim to all occupied territories. Its strengthened military, backed by these guarantees, could serve as a deterrent and a basis for future reclamation efforts through political, economic, or (if circumstances allow) military means, without directly committing NATO to those specific offensive operations.
2. Phased NATO Integration / “Bridge to Membership”:
   • Scenario: NATO formally reaffirms Ukraine’s “future in NATO” (as it has done), but without a concrete timeline for full membership while the war or frozen conflict persists. Instead, it focuses on deep, practical integration. This includes continued military assistance, training, and reforms to align Ukraine’s defense sector fully with NATO standards. This essentially makes Ukraine a de facto NATO partner in all but the Article 5 guarantee.
   • Pros: Keeps the “open door” policy alive, offers a clear long-term goal, and provides substantial immediate support. It allows for continued pressure on Russia to withdraw from territories, as the incentive of eventual NATO membership remains.
   • Cons: Still leaves Ukraine vulnerable in the interim without Article 5. Russia might still see this as a provocation, even without full membership. The “when conditions are met” clause leaves ambiguity.
   • Outcome for Territorial Claims: Similar to the “Israel model,” it allows Ukraine to maintain its claims and build the capacity to pursue them in the future.
3. “Grand Bargain” / International Conference on European Security:
   • Scenario: A comprehensive peace settlement that goes beyond just Ukraine and Russia, involving a wider discussion on European security architecture. This could involve new arms control treaties, revised security agreements, and potentially a new framework for Ukraine’s neutrality if it comes with truly ironclad, multilateral security guarantees from a wide range of powers (including China, perhaps, or a revived OSCE). This would be highly complex and difficult to achieve.
   • Pros: A truly comprehensive and stable peace for Europe.
   • Cons: Extremely difficult to achieve consensus among all parties. Might require Ukraine to formally cede territory, which is politically unpalatable. Russia’s trustworthiness is at an all-time low.
   • Outcome for Territorial Claims: Highly dependent on the terms of such a “grand bargain.” It could involve explicit or implicit recognition of some territorial losses.

Conclusion:

You’re right, Ukraine is indeed in an incredibly difficult position regarding a peace settlement and NATO membership. The current reality is that a quick, clean resolution that satisfies all of Ukraine’s aspirations (full territorial integrity and immediate NATO membership) is highly improbable.

The most likely “better outcomes” focus on strong bilateral security guarantees and deep, phased integration with NATO (without immediate Article 5), combined with EU membership, as the most realistic pathway to long-term security, prosperity, and the eventual possibility of reclaiming lost territories. This approach buys time, allows Ukraine to rebuild and strengthen, and keeps the door open for full NATO membership when geopolitical conditions (and crucially, Russian behavior) fundamentally change. It’s a long game, not a quick fix.

JS: Considering dramatic differences in their geopolitical contexts, would it be fair to say that Ukraine won’t be able to replicate Israel’s position of power in the Middle East because of the presence of Russia? Or will Ukraine be able to develop something similar despite the geopolitical difference? If yes, then what might Ukraine’s Israel-like prominence look like?

Gemini: You’ve raised an excellent point about comparing Ukraine’s potential future to Israel’s current geopolitical standing. While the “Israel model” is often discussed in the context of security guarantees for Ukraine, replicating Israel’s position of power is far more complex due to dramatic differences in their geopolitical contexts, especially the presence of Russia.

Why Ukraine Won’t Be Able to Replicate Israel’s Position of Power in the Middle East (at least not directly):

The primary reason is indeed Russia. The fundamental differences are:

1. Nature of the Adversary:
   • Israel: Faces a collection of state and non-state actors (Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, etc.) who, while posing significant threats, are not a nuclear-armed peer competitor with a vast conventional military and a direct land border with Israel. Many of Israel’s direct neighbors have, over time, normalized relations or at least engaged in de-escalation.¹
   • Ukraine: Directly borders and is in an existential conflict with Russia, a nuclear superpower with a revisionist foreign policy, a massive conventional military (even if degraded), and a deep-seated historical and imperialistic view towards Ukraine.² This adversary is orders of magnitude larger and more complex than anything Israel faces.
2. Geographic Scale and Proximity to Major Powers:
   • Israel: A relatively small country in a geographically contained region, albeit a volatile one.³ It’s geographically distant enough from major global powers (US, Europe) to not immediately trigger a direct world war with every conflict.
   • Ukraine: A large country directly on the border of a nuclear power, and also directly bordering multiple NATO/EU countries. Any major conflict in Ukraine has immediate and profound implications for broader European security. This makes direct intervention or aggressive posturing by Ukraine (even if it’s powerful) far riskier for the international community.
3. Nuclear Deterrence:
   • Israel: Is widely believed to possess an undeclared nuclear arsenal, providing an ultimate deterrent against existential threats.⁴
   • Ukraine: Gave up its nuclear arsenal in 1994 in exchange for security assurances, which Russia then violated. This fundamental difference means Ukraine lacks the ultimate, independent deterrent Israel possesses. The “Israel model” for Ukraine usually refers to conventional military aid, not nuclear guarantees.
4. Nature of Support:
   • Israel: Has a unique, deeply entrenched, and long-standing strategic relationship with the United States, including substantial military aid (often as grants), intelligence sharing, and political backing, often with significant domestic lobbying support within the US.⁵ This support is driven by shared values, strategic interests in the Middle East, and a domestic political constituency.
   • Ukraine: While receiving unprecedented support, it’s primarily due to an ongoing existential invasion and a broader European security imperative.⁶ The level and type of support could fluctuate more based on Western political cycles and fatigue. It’s a relationship forged in crisis, not decades of strategic partnership in a stable region.

Will Ukraine Be Able to Develop Something Similar Despite the Geopolitical Differences?

Yes, Ukraine absolutely can develop something akin to Israel’s prominence, but it will look different and be tailored to its unique context. It won’t be a direct copy, but rather an adaptation of key Israeli strengths to Ukraine’s realities.

What Might Ukraine’s Israel-Like Prominence Look Like?

Ukraine’s prominence would likely be characterized by:

1. Qualitative Military Edge (QME) through Innovation and Adaptability:
   • Battle-Hardened and Doctrine-Shaping: Ukraine will retain a highly experienced, battle-hardened military that has proven capable of adapting to and innovating in modern warfare.⁷ Its experience in drone warfare, electronic warfare, and decentralized command will be lessons for militaries worldwide.
   • Advanced Western Technology + Domestic Innovation: Ukraine will combine significant ongoing access to modern Western military technology with a robust, wartime-accelerated domestic defense industry. This industry will likely specialize in areas where Ukraine has shown particular aptitude:
     • Drone Superpower: Continued leadership in all types of drones (aerial, naval, ground) and anti-drone systems, often incorporating cutting-edge AI.⁸
     • Asymmetric Warfare: Development of advanced long-range precision strike capabilities (missiles, rockets) to offset numerical disadvantages.
     • Cyber Warfare and EW: Expertise in defensive and offensive cyber operations and electronic warfare, critical for future conflicts.
   • Rapid Development and Testing: The necessity of war has forced Ukraine to develop, test, and deploy new technologies at an unprecedented pace.⁹ This agile approach to military innovation could become a permanent feature.
2. Robust Security Guarantees (Non-NATO):
   • As discussed, “Israel Model” security guarantees (bilateral agreements for long-term military aid, training, intelligence) from key Western powers (US, UK, Germany, France) would be crucial. These would provide a credible deterrent and ensure Ukraine’s QME against Russia without an Article 5 commitment.
3. Deep Integration with Western Institutions (Excluding Full NATO Membership in the Short-Term):
   • EU Membership: This is a much more probable and transformative path. EU membership would anchor Ukraine economically and politically to the West, driving reforms, attracting investment, and providing access to a massive single market.¹⁰ This would significantly bolster Ukraine’s resilience.
   • “De Facto” NATO Partner: Even without full Article 5, Ukraine would remain a highly integrated partner with NATO militaries, participating in joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and potentially even joint procurement, effectively making it a crucial part of European security architecture.¹¹
4. Strategic Geopolitical Importance:
   • Ukraine would remain a critical frontline state against Russian aggression, making its stability and strength a vital interest for Europe and the US. This ensures continued attention, investment, and diplomatic support.
   • Its geopolitical position would give it significant leverage in shaping European security policy and energy diversification strategies.
5. A “Frontline Democracy” Identity:
   • Ukraine has already forged a powerful identity as a resilient democracy fighting for its sovereignty against authoritarian aggression.¹² This moral and political capital resonates deeply in the West and provides a strong basis for continued international support.

In essence, Ukraine’s “Israel-like prominence” wouldn’t be about conquering its neighbors or becoming a regional hegemon in the way Israel is sometimes perceived in the Middle East. Instead, it would be about:

• Unrivaled Defensive Capabilities: A highly advanced, innovative, and battle-hardened military capable of deterring and inflicting unacceptable costs on a larger, aggressive neighbor (Russia).
• Deep Western Integration: Strong political, economic, and security ties with the EU and major NATO powers that provide stability and leverage.
• A Symbol of Democratic Resilience: A beacon for democratic values in the face of authoritarian aggression, attracting moral and diplomatic support.¹³

This would allow Ukraine to safeguard its sovereignty, rebuild its economy, and maintain its aspiration to regain lost territories, potentially through political and economic pressure over the long term, backed by its formidable (and Western-supported) defensive capabilities. It’s a strategy of becoming too strong to attack, too valuable to abandon, and too resilient to break.

JS: As usual, we’ve had a rich and satisfying conversation, and I’m coming away with a deeper understanding of issues in the Russia-Ukraine war. Mahalo and a hui hou!

Gemini: Mahalo and a hui hou to you too! I’m glad I could contribute to your deeper understanding of the complex issues surrounding the Russian-Ukraine war. It’s been a truly insightful discussion. You’re most welcome! I’m truly glad to hear that our conversation has provided you with a richer and more satisfying understanding of the complexities surrounding the Russian-Ukraine war. It’s a testament to the importance of exploring these nuanced topics.

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