Educational Technology and Change Journal

By Jim Shimabukuro (assisted by Claude)
Editor

These scenarios represent the two extremes of what could emerge from this unprecedented intervention. The actual outcome will likely fall somewhere between these poles, shaped by decisions made in Washington, Caracas, and capitals across Latin America in the coming months. What remains clear is that the capture of Nicolás Maduro, however tactically brilliant, has created both an extraordinary opportunity and an extraordinary risk for Venezuela, the United States, and the Western Hemisphere as a whole.

Best-Case Scenario: A Democratic Transition and Regional Stabilization

The capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on January 3, 2026, in a dramatic overnight U.S. military operation represents the most consequential American intervention in Latin America since the 1989 invasion of Panama. The dramatic action capped an intensive Trump administration pressure campaign on the South American nation and its autocratic leader and months of secret planning resulting in the most assertive American action to achieve regime change since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. (PBS) In the most optimistic scenario, this bold gambit could catalyze Venezuela’s transformation from a failed narco-state into a functioning democracy, stabilize the Western Hemisphere, and create a model for how targeted regime change operations can succeed when executed with precision and followed by competent post-conflict management.

The foundation for this best-case scenario rests on several critical elements coming together in the weeks and months following Maduro’s removal. First and foremost, the United States would need to abandon President Trump’s concerning signals about working with Maduro’s hand-picked Vice President Delcy Rodríguez and instead throw its full support behind the legitimately elected opposition. If the United States supports the man elected president last year, Edmundo González, he will be able to take power and lead a transition to democracy. (CFR) González, who won the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election according to opposition-verified vote tallies, represents the democratic will of the Venezuelan people and commands genuine popular legitimacy that no Chavista successor could match.

The key to success lies in what Atlantic Council expert Alex Plitsas describes as elite defection triggered by Maduro’s arrest. In the best-case scenario, Maduro’s arrest catalyzes elite defection. Faced with legal exposure, sanctions, and loss of patronage, regime underlings could seek guarantees for safe passage, limited amnesty, or third-country exile in exchange for transferring authority to the legitimately elected opposition. (Atlantic Council) This scenario envisions Venezuelan military commanders, intelligence chiefs, and political enablers calculating that their best chance for survival involves negotiating an orderly exit rather than facing annihilation alongside a collapsing system.

Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López holds the most decisive card in this calculus. As the commander who controls the loyalty of Venezuela’s armed forces, Padrino López could either facilitate a smooth transition or become an obstacle to democratic change. In the best case, he would recognize that the U.S. operation’s surgical precision—which involved elite Delta Force operators, FBI Hostage Rescue Teams, and overwhelming air superiority—demonstrated both American capability and resolve. Rather than risk becoming the next target of U.S. special operations, Padrino López would negotiate terms for the military’s role in a transitional government that includes amnesty provisions for those not directly implicated in the worst human rights abuses.

The economic dimension of this best-case scenario centers on Venezuela’s extraordinary oil wealth. Venezuela is estimated to have the world’s largest proven oil reserves, with more than 303 billion barrels — that represents roughly 17% of the total global oil supply. (CBS) In an optimistic timeline, the United States would facilitate a rapid influx of American and international investment to rebuild Venezuela’s devastated petroleum infrastructure. Francisco J. Monaldi, director of the Latin America energy program at Rice University, provides a roadmap: with proper investment and political stability, Venezuela could eventually produce 4 million barrels per day, dramatically exceeding its current output of roughly 800,000 barrels daily.

This oil-driven recovery would follow a different model than Trump’s troubling comments about the U.S. “running” Venezuela. Instead, a González-led government would negotiate production-sharing agreements with major oil companies—likely including ExxonMobil, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips, all of which have historical claims from Maduro’s nationalizations—that provide fair returns while ensuring Venezuelan national ownership of resources. The heavy, sour crude from Venezuela’s Orinoco Belt would be particularly valuable to U.S. Gulf Coast refineries, which were specifically designed to process this type of oil for diesel and jet fuel production.

The economic transformation would extend beyond oil. A democratic Venezuela with a market-oriented economic framework could attract tens of billions in foreign direct investment across sectors. The country’s strategic location, educated population, and natural resources could make it an economic powerhouse in South America. The normalization of Venezuela’s economy would stem the refugee crisis that has seen more than eight million Venezuelans flee since 2013. María Corina Machado, the Nobel Peace Prize-winning opposition leader who commands a 72 percent approval rating according to a March 2025 poll by ClearPath Strategies, could play a crucial role in national reconciliation even if González serves as president.

The regional implications of a successful democratic transition would be profound. Colombia, which has struggled with Venezuelan refugee flows and border security challenges, would benefit enormously from a stable neighbor. President Gustavo Petro, despite initially condemning the U.S. operation, would likely welcome a democratic Venezuela that could help address regional security challenges including drug trafficking and illegal armed groups. Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who initially called Maduro’s capture an unacceptable violation of sovereignty, would eventually recognize that a prosperous, democratic Venezuela serves Brazilian interests better than the chaos of continued Chavista rule.

The geopolitical benefits for the United States would be substantial. Venezuela under Maduro had become what Shannon K. O’Neil of the Council on Foreign Relations describes as a nexus of malign actors. The regime in Venezuela was sui generis because it combined creating mass migration (eight million people so far), engaging in drug trafficking, and joining the anti-U.S. (CFR) coalition of autocratic states. A democratic Venezuela would eliminate a key platform for Russian, Chinese, Cuban, and Iranian influence in the Western Hemisphere. The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy had declared its intent to deny non-hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or control strategically vital assets in the Americas—a successful Venezuela transition would vindicate that doctrine.

Cuba and Nicaragua, Venezuela’s closest authoritarian allies, would face an existential crisis. Cuba depends heavily on Venezuelan oil subsidies that have sustained its regime since the Soviet collapse. Without Venezuelan support, Havana would confront economic pressures that could finally force political reforms. This domino effect could transform the entire Caribbean Basin, fulfilling the Trump administration’s vision of restored American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere.

The timeline for this best-case scenario would likely unfold over 18 to 36 months. In the first three months following Maduro’s capture, González and the democratic opposition would consolidate power with U.S. diplomatic support. The interim period would see the drafting of a new constitutional framework, the restoration of judicial independence, and the release of political prisoners. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a longtime critic of the Maduro regime, would coordinate with regional partners to provide technical assistance and election monitoring.

By mid-2026, Venezuela would hold internationally supervised elections that would ratify González’s presidency and create a new National Assembly. The opposition’s overwhelming victory in these free and fair elections would provide democratic legitimacy that could never be questioned. The new government would negotiate a truth and reconciliation process modeled on post-apartheid South Africa, providing justice for victims while offering limited amnesty to lower-level Chavista officials who cooperate with the transition.

Throughout 2027, the focus would shift to economic reconstruction. With political stability established, major oil companies would commit to the multi-billion-dollar investments needed to rehabilitate Venezuela’s petroleum infrastructure. Production would begin climbing toward 2 million barrels per day by late 2027, with revenues funding social programs that address the humanitarian crisis created by years of Chavista mismanagement. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank would provide development loans backed by future oil revenues.

By 2028, Venezuela would be unrecognizable from the failed state of the Maduro years. Oil production approaching 3 million barrels daily would generate revenues exceeding $50 billion annually at moderate crude prices. Inflation would be controlled, the currency stabilized, and basic services restored. Venezuelan refugees would begin returning home, reversing one of the largest displacement crises in modern Latin American history. The successful transition would demonstrate that decisive American action, when coupled with genuine commitment to democratic principles, can transform a regional threat into a success story.

This optimistic scenario requires several critical factors to align. The Trump administration must resist the temptation to pursue narrow oil interests at the expense of supporting genuine democratic forces. Regional partners, despite initial skepticism, must provide diplomatic and economic support for the transition. Most importantly, the Venezuelan people and military must seize this opportunity to break definitively with the failed Chavista experiment and embrace democratic governance.

The precedent established by a successful Venezuelan transition would reverberate globally. It would demonstrate that the United States, when acting with precision and purpose, can still shape outcomes in its near abroad. It would validate the use of military force in extreme cases of narco-terrorism and humanitarian crisis. And it would provide hope that even deeply entrenched autocratic regimes can be transformed when their populations demand freedom and accountability.

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Worst-Case Scenario: Fragmentation, Violence, and Regional Destabilization

The same military operation that offers the promise of democratic transformation could instead trigger Venezuela’s descent into a nightmare of prolonged conflict, humanitarian catastrophe, and regional chaos that makes the current crisis seem modest by comparison. The worst-case scenario envisions a multi-year guerrilla war, the fragmentation of Venezuelan state authority, massive refugee flows, and the entrenchment of criminal networks that would turn large swaths of the country into ungovernable territory reminiscent of post-Gaddafi Libya or Somalia.

The foundation for this catastrophic outcome has already been laid by President Trump’s deeply troubling comments following the operation. Trump said Saturday that he hadn’t been in touch with Machado and said it would be “very tough” for her to lead Venezuela. “She doesn’t have the support within or the respect within the country. She’s a very nice woman, but she doesn’t have the respect,” Trump said. (PBS) This dismissal of Venezuela’s most popular democratic leader, combined with suggestions of working with Maduro’s Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, signals a fundamental misunderstanding of Venezuelan politics that could prove fatal to any transition effort.

Roxanna Vigil of the Council on Foreign Relations captures the core problem with devastating clarity. Unfortunately, Trump gave little indication that his administration has developed any credible “day after” plan. He spoke about the United States running Venezuela during a transition period—a recipe for an Iraq-style disaster—and seemed to suggest that Washington might work with Maduro’s hand-picked vice president, Delcy Rodriquez, who was deeply implicated in his oppression and corruption. (CFR) An Iraq-style disaster is precisely what Venezuela risks if the United States attempts to impose governance without genuine Venezuelan buy-in or continues to empower Chavista figures who lack popular legitimacy.

The immediate aftermath of Maduro’s capture reveals how quickly the situation could deteriorate. Shannon K. O’Neil observes the continued power of hardline elements: Maduro is gone but hardline repressive elements of the regime are still there and, at least for the moment, in control. Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, like Maduro a long-time Chavista, has asserted her authority—though she is reported to be out of the country, in Moscow. Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López quickly stepped in publicly to take control on the ground. And hardline Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello released a video showing himself surrounded by armed police, condemning U.S. (CFR) intervention.

Diosdado Cabello represents perhaps the most dangerous wildcard in this scenario. As Interior Minister, Cabello controls internal security forces, intelligence networks, and has deep connections to organized crime. Unlike Maduro, who was more of a political figurehead, Cabello is a hardened operator with the means and motivation to wage an insurgency against any U.S.-backed government. His video statement surrounded by armed police demonstrates both his defiance and his capacity to mobilize loyal security forces.

In the worst case, Cabello would reject any negotiated settlement and instead activate the colectivos—armed civilian militias that have served as shock troops for the Chavista regime. These groups, numbering in the tens of thousands, are ideologically committed to the Bolivarian Revolution and have been indoctrinated to view the United States as an imperialist aggressor. Combined with elements of the military and intelligence services, they could form the nucleus of a potent insurgency.

Alex Plitsas of the Atlantic Council describes this nightmare scenario with chilling precision. The worst-case scenario is far darker. If regime remnants reject negotiation and fragment, Venezuela could descend into a protracted guerrilla conflict. Armed colectivos, criminalized military units, and narco-linked factions could wage asymmetric warfare, turning parts of the country into contested zones and prolonging civilian suffering long after the regime’s formal collapse. (Atlantic Council)

The fragmentation of state authority would create conditions ideal for criminal exploitation. Venezuela has become deeply penetrated by narco-trafficking organizations, with routes moving Colombian cocaine through the country to Caribbean and Central American markets. Elements of the Venezuelan military are directly implicated in the drug trade—this is precisely why U.S. Attorney General Pam Bondi charged Maduro with narco-terrorism. In a collapsed state scenario, these military-criminal networks would expand their operations, potentially creating narco-states within Venezuela similar to what emerged in parts of Mexico and Central America.

The humanitarian consequences would be staggering. Elizabeth Dickinson of the International Crisis Group notes that Venezuelans are already living on the edge: “Venezuela is living day-to-day. We’re talking about a situation of resource scarcity and families that are having to eat sometimes only two times a day,” Dickinson added. “And the way that the government has consolidated its power has really been through that redistribution of limited resources, handing out both food but also just (Fortune) basic necessities. In a scenario of violent conflict, even these minimal survival mechanisms would collapse.

A renewed refugee crisis would dwarf the current displacement. The more than eight million Venezuelans who have already fled would be joined by millions more seeking to escape violence. Colombia, which shares a 1,370-mile border with Venezuela, would bear the brunt of this exodus. President Petro has already announced deployment of security forces along the border to prepare for potential refugee flows. Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and Chile—all of which host significant Venezuelan diaspora populations—would face renewed pressures that could strain their social services and inflame anti-immigrant sentiment.

The regional security implications would cascade across Latin America. Armed groups operating in Venezuela—including remnants of Colombian guerrilla organizations like the ELN—would gain freedom of movement in ungoverned spaces. The porous borders would allow weapons, drugs, and fighters to flow in multiple directions. Neighboring countries might feel compelled to conduct their own military operations in Venezuelan territory, risking broader regional conflict.

The geopolitical dimension makes this scenario even more dangerous. Russia has already condemned the U.S. operation as “armed aggression against Venezuela” and offered to play a diplomatic role. Russia, another supporter of Maduro, called it “armed aggression against Venezuela,” saying the strikes were “concerning and condemnable,” but offering Moscow as a diplomatic player that can help ensure stability. (NBC) In a worst-case scenario, Russia could provide covert military assistance to Chavista remnants fighting U.S.-backed forces, turning Venezuela into a proxy battleground similar to Syria.

China’s response has been even more forceful, with its Foreign Ministry issuing a strong condemnation. “China is deeply shocked by and strongly condemns the U.S.’s blatant use of force against a sovereign state and action against its president,” the spokesperson said. The statement continued: “Such hegemonic acts of the U.S. seriously violate international law and Venezuela’s sovereignty, and threaten peace and security in Latin America and the Caribbean region.” (NBC) Chinese investment in Venezuelan oil infrastructure and mining operations gives Beijing leverage in any transition process. If China perceives that U.S. actions threaten its economic interests, it could provide financial and material support to regime remnants or simply refuse to cooperate with debt restructuring—effectively blocking Venezuela’s economic recovery.

Cuba’s response reveals the stakes for authoritarian allies. Cuba’s Foreign Ministry issued a lengthy statement calling the operation “cowardly U.S. aggression” and declaring readiness to give “even our own blood” in solidarity with Venezuela. The statement added that Cuba is “prepared to give, as we would for Cuba, even our own blood.” (NBC) This is not mere rhetoric—Cuban intelligence and security personnel have been deeply embedded in Venezuela for decades, helping to sustain the Chavista regime. In a worst-case scenario, Cuba could dispatch advisors, intelligence operatives, and possibly even military personnel to support an anti-U.S. insurgency, calculating that Venezuela’s fall would seal Cuba’s own fate.

The oil dimension would worsen this scenario rather than ameliorate it. Jorge León of Rystad Energy warns that the situation could mirror Libya after Gaddafi’s overthrow. If, however, Venezuela looks more like Libya after the toppling of Muammar Gaddafi, where the country remained in disarray and foreign capital was loath to enter, a further constriction of the Venezuelan oil market would result. Libya’s oil production remains chaotic more than a decade after Gaddafi’s fall, with competing militias fighting over control of facilities and revenues. Venezuela’s petroleum infrastructure is far more complex and degraded than Libya’s was, requiring investments exceeding $100 billion over a decade according to expert Francisco Monaldi. No oil company would commit such resources to a war zone.

The timeline of this catastrophic scenario would unfold over years of grinding violence. In the initial months following Maduro’s capture, Venezuela would (Yahoo) experience what appears to be a power vacuum as Rodríguez, Padrino López, and Cabello maneuver for position. The Trump administration’s lack of a coherent political strategy would leave opposition forces fragmented and demoralized. By mid-2026, the first major insurgent attacks would target Venezuelan military installations, oil facilities, and government offices in Caracas.

Throughout the second half of 2026 and into 2027, the conflict would metastasize. Different regions of Venezuela would fall under the control of various armed factions—Chavista militias in the western states near Colombia, criminal gangs controlling sections of the capital, and opposition forces holding parts of the east. The United States would face pressure to deploy ground troops to protect oil installations and key infrastructure, but would resist a large-scale occupation given memories of Iraq and Afghanistan.

By 2027-2028, Venezuela would resemble a failed state in the mold of Libya, Yemen, or Somalia. Multiple armed factions would control different territories, with no group capable of establishing nationwide authority. Oil production would collapse below 300,000 barrels daily as facilities are repeatedly attacked and sabotaged. Humanitarian conditions would deteriorate to famine levels in some regions. International organizations would struggle to provide aid as security conditions prevent access to affected populations.

The United States would find itself trapped in an unwinnable situation. Military occupation would require hundreds of thousands of troops and face fierce resistance, making it politically untenable especially as the 2028 presidential election approaches. Withdrawal would leave chaos that threatens regional stability and U.S. interests. The operation that was supposed to demonstrate American resolve would instead reveal the limits of military power in achieving political transformation.

International legal consequences would compound these problems. “This is clearly a blatant, illegal and criminal act,” said Jimmy Gurule, a Notre Dame Law School professor and former assistant U.S. attorney. Mark Nevitt, a former Navy attorney who now teaches at Emory University School of Law, said, “I see no legal basis for us to go into another country and take a leader without an extradition treaty.” (PBS) These legal concerns, while initially dismissed by the Trump administration, would gain force as the human costs mounted. International criminal court investigations, diplomatic isolation, and damage to American credibility would all flow from an operation seen globally as violating fundamental principles of sovereignty.

The precedent established would be catastrophic for international order. Other nations would view the Venezuelan operation as proof that the United States has abandoned the rules-based international system in favor of might-makes-right imperialism. This would accelerate the very multipolar competition the United States claims to oppose, as countries hedge against American power by strengthening ties with China and Russia. Latin American nations specifically would view the intervention as confirmation of their worst fears about U.S. hegemony—what Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele called defending “the law of the strongest.”

The ultimate tragedy of this worst-case scenario is that it would leave Venezuelans worse off than under Maduro’s oppressive but stable rule. Claudia Sheinbaum, president of Mexico, captured the essence of this concern in her condemnation of the intervention, echoing former Mexican President Benito Juárez: “Respect for the rights of others is peace.” The violation of Venezuelan sovereignty, absent a credible plan for sustainable democratic governance, would produce not liberation but chaos—chaos that could last a generation and spread suffering across an entire region.

The worst-case scenario ultimately represents a failure not of military capability but of strategic wisdom. The U.S. military’s tactical brilliance in capturing Maduro—an operation requiring precise intelligence, detailed planning, and flawless execution—would be revealed as meaningless without the political acumen to build a stable post-Maduro order. As Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations observes, this represents a recurring American dilemma: The recurring U.S. national security dilemma since 1945 has been the difficulty of translating tactical military successes into strategic ones. (CFR) Venezuela could become the latest and most painful example of this enduring challenge, with consequences that reverberate for decades across the hemisphere.

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