Educational Technology and Change Journal

By Jim Shimabukuro (assisted by Grok)

Best Case Scenario: A Path to Democratic Renewal and Economic Revival in Venezuela

In the wake of President Donald Trump’s audacious military incursion into Venezuela on January 3, 2026, which resulted in the capture and arrest of Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores, the United States finds itself at a pivotal juncture in Latin American geopolitics. This operation, executed with precision by U.S. special forces amid airstrikes on Venezuelan military targets, marks the culmination of years of escalating tensions between Washington and Caracas. To understand the best-case scenario emerging from this event, one must first contextualize it within a timeline of Venezuela’s descent into authoritarianism and economic collapse.

The roots trace back to 1999, when Hugo Chávez assumed power, initiating a socialist revolution that initially benefited from high oil prices but devolved into corruption and mismanagement after his death in 2013. Maduro, Chávez’s successor, consolidated control through rigged elections, most notably the disputed 2018 vote that led to international non-recognition by over 50 countries, including the U.S. In 2019, the Trump administration recognized opposition leader Juan Guaidó as interim president, imposing sanctions that crippled Venezuela’s oil sector.

The crisis deepened with the 2024 presidential election, where opposition candidate Edmundo González claimed victory with independent tallies showing him garnering over 60% of the vote, only for Maduro to declare himself the winner amid widespread fraud allegations. This set the stage for Trump’s second-term intervention, framed as a response to Maduro’s alleged narco-trafficking ties and the harboring of terrorist groups like the ELN guerrillas.

In the best-case outlook, Maduro’s removal catalyzes a swift and orderly transition to democracy, leveraging the opposition’s legitimacy and international support to rebuild Venezuela’s institutions and economy. Key figures such as María Corina Machado, the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize winner and leader of the opposition coalition, and Edmundo González, the exiled diplomat who won the 2024 election according to monitors like the Carter Center, would assume central roles in a transitional government.

Machado, known for her staunch anti-Chavismo stance and ability to mobilize millions, could serve as a unifying force, drawing on her experience in the National Assembly where she was elected in 2015 with the highest vote count in Venezuelan history. González, with his diplomatic background, might focus on international relations, negotiating the lifting of sanctions and attracting foreign investment. The U.S., under Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio—a vocal critic of Maduro since his Senate days—would provide logistical and financial support without overstepping into direct governance, adhering to Trump’s promise of a “safe, proper, and judicious transition.”

This scenario begins immediately post-capture, with U.S. forces securing key sites in Caracas and Maracaibo for a brief period—perhaps two to four weeks—to prevent looting or power vacuums. By mid-February 2026, a transitional council, including disaffected Chavistas like former military officials who defected during the 2019 uprising, could convene under United Nations oversight. The Organization of American States (OAS), led by Secretary General Luis Almagro, who has condemned Maduro since 2017, would facilitate this process, drawing parallels to the OAS’s role in Honduras’ 2009 crisis resolution. Elections could be scheduled for late 2026 or early 2027, ensuring a fair process monitored by international observers from the European Union and the Carter Center, which previously documented Maduro’s electoral manipulations.

Economically, the best case hinges on revitalizing Venezuela’s oil industry, home to the world’s largest proven reserves at over 300 billion barrels. With Maduro’s regime dismantled, U.S. companies like Chevron and Halliburton—already operating under limited licenses since 2023—could ramp up production from the current 800,000 barrels per day to pre-sanction levels of 2-3 million by 2028. This influx would stabilize global oil prices, benefiting allies like Saudi Arabia, and generate revenue for social programs, reducing poverty that has afflicted 80% of Venezuelans since 2019. Trump’s emphasis on recovering “stolen oil” aligns with this, as audits could reclaim assets funneled through Maduro’s cronies, such as the $10 billion allegedly laundered via PDVSA, Venezuela’s state oil company.

Socially, the transition would stem the migration crisis that has seen over 7 million Venezuelans flee since 2015, straining neighbors like Colombia and Brazil. With stability, repatriation programs, supported by the UNHCR, could encourage returns, bolstered by U.S. aid packages similar to the $1.2 billion allocated in 2020. Reduced influence from adversaries like Cuba, Iran, and Russia—whose support for Maduro included military advisors since 2019—would diminish narco-trafficking networks, including the Cartel of the Suns led by figures like Diosdado Cabello. Elliott Abrams, a former U.S. special envoy for Venezuela, supports this view in a Council on Foreign Relations brief, stating, “If the U.S. supports Edmundo González, who is recognized as the 2024 election winner, he could take power and lead a transition to democracy, preventing continuation of drug trafficking, mass migration, and roles for Cuba and Iran.” (CFR)

Regionally, this outcome signals a deterrent to authoritarianism. Leaders like Mexico’s Claudia Sheinbaum and Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who initially condemned the incursion, might pivot to cooperation if democratic gains materialize, fostering a “zone of peace” as Lula advocated in 2023. Christopher Sabatini of Chatham House echoes this optimism, noting, “The capture could open a path to regime change, creating divisions within Maduro’s regime… if Trump supports democracy beyond ‘Madurismo’ rotations, it might lead to a new chapter.” (chathamhouse)

Globally, the U.S. bolsters its image as a defender of democracy without prolonged entanglement. Allies in Europe, initially cautious like Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz, could endorse the transition, as Merz suggested the objective is “an orderly transition to an elected government.” France’s Emmanuel Macron, who rejoiced at the end of Maduro’s dictatorship, might lead EU aid efforts, drawing on his 2024 calls for Venezuelan sanctions relief post-fair elections. (NYT)

Challenges remain, such as integrating former Chavistas to avoid purges that could alienate supporters, but with strategic diplomacy, this scenario transforms Venezuela from a failed state into a regional powerhouse. By 2030, GDP could rebound to pre-2013 levels, exceeding $200 billion, fueled by diversified investments beyond oil, including tourism and agriculture. The key to success lies in Trump’s restraint—focusing on empowerment rather than control—and the opposition’s unity under Machado and González. As one scenario in a Stamford Advocate analysis posits, “Washington leveraging its new position to push forcefully for complete regime change… a recognized opposition leader would be ushered into office,” leading to legitimacy and reform. (stamfordadvocate)

This best-case trajectory not only liberates Venezuela but reinforces hemispheric stability, proving that decisive action, when paired with democratic principles, can yield enduring positive change. The arrest of Maduro, while controversial, becomes a turning point, echoing the fall of Manuel Noriega in Panama in 1989, where U.S. intervention paved the way for democratic elections by 1994. With careful execution, Venezuela’s future could shine as a beacon of renewal in Latin America.

Worst Case Scenario: Descent into Chaos, Regional Conflict, and U.S. Entanglement

The U.S.-led incursion and arrest of Nicolás Maduro on January 3, 2026, while hailed by some as a bold strike against authoritarianism, carries profound risks that could plunge Venezuela into prolonged turmoil and entangle the United States in an unwinnable quagmire. This worst-case scenario draws from historical precedents of failed interventions and the complex web of alliances sustaining Maduro’s regime. To grasp its potential unfolding, consider the timeline of U.S.-Venezuela relations: From the 2002 failed coup against Hugo Chávez, which Maduro later cited as evidence of Yankee imperialism, to the 2017 imposition of sanctions under Trump that halved oil production, escalating to the 2020 indictment of Maduro on narco-terrorism charges by the Department of Justice.

The 2024 election fraud, where Maduro’s National Electoral Council falsified results despite González’s victory, prompted renewed calls for action. Trump’s second term, beginning January 20, 2025, saw rapid escalation, culminating in the January 3 raid amid airstrikes that captured Maduro en route to New York for trial.

In this dire outlook, Maduro’s removal triggers fragmentation rather than unity, with remnants of his regime—led by figures like Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, and Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López—mounting armed resistance. Rodríguez, often called Maduro’s enforcer and sister to former Foreign Minister Jorge Rodríguez, could flee to Moscow as reported, coordinating with Russian advisors who have bolstered Venezuelan defenses since 2019. Cabello, a hardliner with ties to the Cartel of the Suns, might activate paramilitary colectivos—armed groups numbering over 100,000—that have suppressed protests since the 2014 uprisings. Padrino López, commanding the 150,000-strong military, could splinter forces, leading to civil strife reminiscent of Syria’s post-2011 chaos.

The immediate aftermath, from January 4 to March 2026, sees sporadic violence in Caracas and border regions, where ELN guerrillas and FARC dissidents—harbored by Maduro since 2018—launch attacks on U.S.-backed installations. Without a credible “day after” plan, as critiqued by CFR expert Max Boot, the U.S. assumes de facto occupation, deploying additional troops beyond the initial special forces. Trump’s declaration to “run the country” evolves into a prolonged presence, echoing the Iraq invasion of 2003, where initial success gave way to insurgency by 2004. By mid-2026, U.S. casualties mount, straining domestic support amid congressional pushback from figures like Senator Ruben Gallego, a Democrat and former Marine, who labeled the action an “illegal war” without authorization. (WSJ)

Economically, prioritizing oil extraction alienates Venezuelans, as U.S. firms like Chevron face sabotage, delaying production ramps. Reserves remain stranded due to legal uncertainties, with GDP contracting further from 2025’s $90 billion low. Migration surges, with another 2-3 million fleeing by 2027, overwhelming Colombia—already hosting 2.5 million—and Brazil, prompting border closures and humanitarian crises. The UNHCR, which warned of 8 million refugees by 2025, could see numbers double, exacerbating regional tensions.

Internationally, condemnation isolates the U.S. Brazil’s President Lula da Silva decries it as evoking “the worst moments of interference” in Latin America, potentially severing diplomatic ties and rallying the UN against the U.S. (https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/03/world/americas/maduro-capture-venezuela-reaction-global.html) Allies like Cuba and Russia retaliate; Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel, successor to Raúl Castro, might escalate proxy actions, while Vladimir Putin uses it to justify Ukraine incursions. China, Venezuela’s largest creditor with $60 billion in loans since 2007, could seize assets or support resistance, complicating Trump’s trade agenda. (NYT)

Legally, the operation’s illegality, as analyzed by Steve Vladeck, undermines U.S. credibility: “Friday night’s U.S. military operation in Venezuela was a textbook violation of international law. It’s also entirely unauthorized by U.S. law, which ought to (but probably won’t) matter.” Maduro’s trial in Manhattan faces immunity challenges, potentially dragging into 2027 and embarrassing the U.S. if dismissed. (stevevladeck)

Regionally, hybrid conflict emerges, with no clear winner by 2028, as outlined in a Stamford Advocate scenario: “A protracted struggle in which no actor fully prevails… Venezuela could lurch into years of managed instability.” (https://www.stamfordadvocate.com/news/article/5-scenarios-for-a-post-maduro-venezuela-and-21275068.php) Opposition fractures, with Machado and González sidelined, as Trump doubts their viability, leading to infighting. (stamfordadvocate)

This scenario culminates in U.S. withdrawal by 2030 amid mounting costs—estimated at $50-100 billion, per Chatham House’s Laurel Rapp—leaving a failed state vulnerable to narco-control. Phil Gunson of the International Crisis Group warns, “The worst-case scenario would be that parts of the military adhere to the U.S. plan, while others resist, and the situation develops into a sort of internal armed conflict.” (WSJ)

Ultimately, this path erodes U.S. moral authority, fuels anti-Americanism, and perpetuates Venezuela’s suffering, proving that unchecked intervention can birth greater instability than the tyranny it seeks to end.

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