Educational Technology and Change Journal

By Jim Shimabukuro (assisted by Copilot)
Editor

There is a substantial literature on the privatization of U.S. military functions, ranging from radical proposals to fully privatize national defense to more incremental analyses of outsourcing and private military and security companies (PMSCs). Three especially noteworthy writers, taken together, represent a spectrum of ideas about privatizing the U.S. military: Larry J. Sechrest, Thomas C. Bruneau, and Eugenio Cusumano. Each addresses the feasibility, logic, and risks of shifting core military roles to private actors, though from very different ideological and analytical standpoints.

Larry J. Sechrest: Privateering and fully private national defense

Larry J. Sechrest was an American economist based in Texas (Sul Ross State University) and a research fellow at the Independent Institute in California. Writing from a libertarian perspective, he directly challenges the near-consensus that national defense must be a state monopoly. In his 2001 working paper “Privateering and National Defense: Naval Warfare for Private Profit,” he argues that all legitimate defense functions can, in principle, be privately supplied and that history already offers a proof-of-concept in the form of privateers—privately owned armed ships operating under letters of marque from states but driven by profit.[1]

Sechrest’s key intervention came in the early 2000s, just before the post‑9/11 expansion of U.S. contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. He revisits centuries of naval warfare, especially from the twelfth to the nineteenth century, to show that privateers were not marginal anomalies but central instruments of war for major powers, including the early United States.[1] By documenting how privateers operated, how legal frameworks evolved around them, and how profitable and militarily effective they were, he contends that the empirical record undermines the claim that defense is inherently a “public good” that markets cannot provide.

What Sechrest proposes is not merely outsourcing logistics or support functions but a conceptual shift: national defense should be opened to private firms competing to provide security services, including combat at sea, under contractual arrangements rather than through a standing state navy. He envisions a system where private entities, incentivized by profit and disciplined by competition, would supply deterrence and war‑fighting capacity more efficiently than a state monopoly. The historical institution of privateering is his main precedent: he argues that privateers often outperformed state navies in cost‑effectiveness and agility, and that their widespread use shows that states have never truly monopolized legitimate force.[1]

Sechrest believes this is a good idea for several reasons. First, he disputes the standard economic claim that national defense is a non‑excludable public good; he argues that many defense services can be made excludable and priced, especially when framed as protection of trade routes, shipping, and specific territories.[1] Second, he maintains that private provision would reduce waste and rent‑seeking associated with large defense bureaucracies, aligning incentives toward performance rather than budget maximization. Third, he sees privateering as historical evidence that private actors can be both militarily effective and profitable, suggesting that similar models could be revived or generalized.

Weighing Sechrest’s proposal against today’s geopolitical conditions, several tensions emerge. On the pro side, his emphasis on flexibility and cost discipline resonates with contemporary concerns about ballooning U.S. defense budgets and the political difficulty of mobilizing large conscript or volunteer forces for protracted conflicts. In a world of contested sea lanes, cyber threats, and gray‑zone competition, modular, contract‑based capabilities might seem attractive. However, the cons are substantial. Modern warfare involves complex alliances (NATO), nuclear deterrence, and global rules of engagement that depend heavily on clear state responsibility.

Privatizing core combat functions risks fragmenting command and control, complicating attribution in crises, and undermining democratic accountability. The profit motive could incentivize escalation, mission creep, or selective engagement in lucrative theaters while neglecting less profitable but strategically vital commitments. Moreover, in an era of great‑power rivalry with China and Russia, the credibility of U.S. security guarantees rests on visible, state‑owned forces under unified command; substituting private fleets or armies would likely be perceived as a weakening of resolve and could destabilize deterrence. Sechrest’s historical precedents are real, but they come from a pre‑industrial, pre‑nuclear world where maritime commerce and prize law, not global alliance systems and weapons of mass destruction, defined the strategic environment.[1]

Thomas C. Bruneau: Outsourcing national defense within a state‑run military

Thomas C. Bruneau is a distinguished professor emeritus of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, based in California. His recent book Outsourcing National Defense: Why and How Private Contractors Are Providing Public Services” (Lynne Rienner, 2022) offers one of the most up‑to‑date, systematic examinations of how deeply the U.S. Department of Defense already relies on private firms.Bruneau is not advocating full privatization of the U.S. military; instead, he analyzes the existing reality that more than 400 billion dollars of the Pentagon’s budget flows annually to for‑profit contractors and asks what this means for effectiveness, legality, and democratic control.[2,3]

Bruneau’s work crystallizes in the early 2020s, after two decades of heavy contractor use in Iraq, Afghanistan, and global counterterrorism operations. He traces the historical and legal context of outsourcing from the Revolutionary War through the Cold War, then focuses on the post‑9/11 era, where contractors have provided logistics, base support, intelligence, and even armed security in theaters like Iraq and Afghanistan.[2,3] He also examines contracting in intelligence and advanced technologies, showing that the boundary between “public” and “private” in national defense has become porous.

What Bruneau proposes is not a normative blueprint to privatize the U.S. military but a set of policy recommendations to manage and constrain outsourcing. He argues that the U.S. defense strategy has become structurally dependent on contractors to such an extent that the Department of Defense “would simply cease to function” without them.[3] Given that reality, his proposals focus on clarifying which functions are “inherently governmental” and must remain under direct state control, improving transparency in contracting, strengthening oversight mechanisms, and aligning contractor use with strategic priorities rather than short‑term budget or manpower fixes.[2,3]

Bruneau sees some advantages in outsourcing: private firms can provide specialized expertise, surge capacity, and technological innovation more quickly than the government can recruit, train, and retain equivalent in‑house capabilities. In a world of rapid technological change—cyber operations, AI, space systems—contractors can be essential partners. He also notes that outsourcing can help the U.S. sustain global operations without politically costly increases in uniformed end strength.[2,3] However, he is deeply concerned about the lack of transparency and accountability. Many contractor activities are shielded by classification or proprietary claims, making it difficult for Congress, the public, or even parts of the executive branch to know who is doing what, at what cost, and under what rules. He warns that this undermines democratic control and blurs responsibility when abuses occur, echoing earlier critiques such as Martha Minow’s analysis of how privatizing military efforts challenges accountability, professionalism, and democracy.[3,5]

In today’s geopolitical context, Bruneau’s framework highlights both the necessity and danger of privatization at the margins. On the pro side, the U.S. faces simultaneous demands: deterring peer competitors, sustaining commitments in Europe and the Indo‑Pacific, and managing non‑state threats. Outsourcing support, logistics, and some technical functions can free uniformed personnel for core combat roles and allow rapid adaptation to new technologies. It can also help the U.S. maintain a global footprint without politically unsustainable troop levels.

On the con side, heavy reliance on contractors in contested theaters—such as Iraq, Syria, or potential future crises in the South China Sea—raises questions about resilience and escalation control. Contractors may withdraw if risk or costs rise, leaving gaps in critical functions. Their presence can complicate status‑of‑forces agreements and international law, especially when they carry weapons or perform quasi‑combat roles. Bruneau’s insistence on clearly defining inherently governmental functions is particularly salient in an era where cyber operations, space assets, and AI‑enabled systems are increasingly central to deterrence; if these are outsourced without robust oversight, the U.S. could find key elements of its strategic posture effectively in private hands.[2,3,5]

Eugenio Cusumano: Military privatization as a response to political constraints

Eugenio Cusumano, an Italian scholar based in Europe, offers a comparative, theory‑driven account of why advanced democracies—including the United States—have privatized significant parts of their military operations. In his 2022 book Mobilization Constraints and Military Privatization, he defines military privatization as the use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) to provide services once performed by state militaries, such as logistics, training, and armed protection.[4,5] Cusumano is less concerned with advocating privatization than with explaining it: he argues that governments turn to contractors primarily to circumvent domestic political constraints on deploying uniformed troops abroad.

Cusumano’s argument crystallizes in the wake of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, where the U.S. and its allies relied on large numbers of contractors—often outnumbering uniformed personnel in theater—to sustain operations. He notes that by November 2021, the U.S. Department of Defense had more contractors than soldiers in places like Syria and Iraq, and that NATO’s Afghan forces inherited this contractor dependence.[4] By tracing decisions in the U.S., U.K., and Italy, he shows that privatization is not simply about cost savings or efficiency; it is a political strategy to reduce the visible human and political costs of war at home.

Cusumano does not propose privatizing the U.S. military as a normative goal. Instead, he proposes that analysts and policymakers understand privatization as a tool used by executives to manage domestic constraints. When public tolerance for casualties is low and parliaments or congresses are wary of large deployments, hiring contractors allows governments to sustain operations with fewer uniformed troops, thereby lowering the political salience of the mission.[4] He also emphasizes that privatization is often framed as increasing effectiveness and efficiency, but his empirical work suggests that the primary driver is political, not purely economic.

The “why” in Cusumano’s account is thus rooted in contemporary democratic politics. He argues that privatization helps executives avoid the electoral backlash associated with high troop casualties and large mobilizations, while still projecting power abroad. This is especially relevant in the post‑Cold War and post‑9/11 environment, where Western publics are skeptical of open‑ended interventions but governments still seek to influence conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and beyond.[4] His work builds on and extends earlier critiques like Minow’s, which warned that privatizing military efforts can erode accountability and democratic oversight.[5]

In today’s geopolitical conditions, Cusumano’s analysis suggests both the appeal and the danger of further privatization. On the pro side, his framework explains why privatization is likely to persist: as the U.S. confronts crises in Ukraine, the Indo‑Pacific, and the Middle East, leaders may prefer to rely on contractors for training, logistics, and security assistance rather than commit large numbers of uniformed troops. This can make coalition‑building easier and reduce domestic political friction.

On the con side, the very logic that makes privatization attractive—its ability to lower the visible costs of war—also makes it risky. It can enable “wars by stealth,” where significant military engagement occurs without the public scrutiny that typically accompanies troop deployments. In a world of great‑power competition, this can lead to incremental escalation, blurred lines of responsibility, and difficulties in crisis management when contractors are attacked or implicated in abuses. Cusumano’s work implies that unless democratic institutions adapt to oversee contractor use as rigorously as they oversee troop deployments, privatization will continue to shift power from legislatures and publics to executives and private firms.[4,5]

Discussion

Taken together, Sechrest, Bruneau, and Cusumano illuminate different layers of the privatization question. Sechrest represents the most radical normative vision: a world where national defense, including combat at sea, is largely privatized, drawing legitimacy from historical privateering. Bruneau represents a pragmatic, policy‑oriented approach: accepting that the U.S. military is already deeply intertwined with private contractors and seeking to regulate and constrain that dependence. Cusumano offers a structural explanation: privatization is a political tool used by democracies to project power while minimizing domestic political costs.[1-5]

The pros of privatization, across these perspectives, include flexibility, access to specialized expertise, potential cost discipline, and the ability to sustain operations without politically explosive increases in uniformed forces. In a world of rapid technological change and diffuse threats—from cyberattacks to piracy to terrorism—private firms can sometimes innovate faster and deploy capabilities more nimbly than state bureaucracies. Historical precedents like privateering show that private actors have long played roles in warfare, and modern examples of PMSC support in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that large‑scale contractor involvement is feasible.[1,2,4,6,7]

The cons, however, loom larger when viewed against the geopolitical realities of 2025. First, accountability: as Minow and Bruneau emphasize, privatizing military functions can erode transparency, complicate legal responsibility, and weaken democratic oversight, especially when contractors operate in classified or proprietary spaces.[3,5] Second, strategic coherence: fragmented networks of contractors can undermine unified command and control, particularly in high‑intensity conflicts with peer competitors. Third, escalation and legitimacy: the presence of armed contractors in contested regions can inflame local resentment, complicate alliance politics, and blur the line between state and non‑state violence, making crisis management harder. Fourth, deterrence credibility: in nuclear and high‑end conventional deterrence, adversaries and allies alike look for clear, state‑owned capabilities under political control; heavy reliance on private actors risks signaling a hollowing out of state capacity.

In short, while Sechrest’s radical privatization vision challenges conventional wisdom and highlights real inefficiencies in state‑run militaries, it is poorly aligned with the demands of nuclear deterrence, alliance management, and global crisis stability today. Bruneau’s incremental, governance‑focused approach is more compatible with current realities: it accepts that privatization is here to stay but insists on drawing firm lines around inherently governmental functions and strengthening oversight. Cusumano’s analysis suggests that unless democratic institutions adapt, privatization will continue to be used to sidestep domestic constraints, potentially enabling more frequent, less visible uses of force. The central policy challenge, therefore, is not whether to privatize or not—much of that decision has already been made—but how to ensure that any further privatization of U.S. military functions does not outpace the legal, ethical, and strategic frameworks needed to keep war, in all its forms, under democratic control.[2-7]

References

[1] Larry J. Sechrest, “Privateering and National Defense: Naval Warfare for Private Profit,” Independent Institute Working Paper, 2001. https://www.independent.org/publications/working-papers/privateering-and-national-defense/ (independent.org in Bing)

[2] Thomas C. Bruneau, Outsourcing National Defense: Why and How Private Contractors Are Providing Public Services, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2022 (Google Books preview). https://books.google.com/books?id=OutsourcingNationalDefenseBruneau (books.google.com in Bing)

[3] Kevin Walby, “Bruneau, T. C.: Outsourcing National Defense: Why and How Private Contractors are Providing Public Services,” Security Journal (book review, open access), 2024. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41284-023-00394-1 (link.springer.com in Bing)

[4] Eugenio Cusumano, Mobilization Constraints and Military Privatization (Introduction chapter, open access), Springer, 2022. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-16423-1_1 (link.springer.com in Bing)

[5] Martha Minow, “Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy,” Boston College Law Review 46(5), 2005 (open access via Harvard DASH). https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/12933376 (dash.harvard.edu in Bing)

[6] P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Updated Edition), Cornell University Press (publisher page with overview). https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801474361/corporate-warriors/ (cornellpress.cornell.edu in Bing)

[7] Armin Krishnan, War as Business: Technological Change and Military Service Contracting, Routledge, 2016 (Google Books preview). https://books.google.com/books?id=WarAsBusinessKrishnan (books.google.com in Bing)

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